CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
RESTORING JUSTICE, RESPECTING RESPONSIBILITY,
AND RENEWING PUBLIC NORMS
Maggie T. Grace ∗
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores theoretical concerns underlying contemporary
appeals to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the criminal justice
system. Drawing on philosophical literature on free will and responsibility
and leading work on transitional justice, I argue that a restorative justice
lens reveals how ADR can address realities of social foundations of crime
while respecting deeply-held commitments to personal responsibility and
public norms. I further argue that this approach provides a useful response
to critics, such as Owen Fiss, who argue that ADR privatizes disputes,
thereby failing to produce and reinforce essential public norms.
In 2001, the Surgeon General identified factors that are highly
correlated with, if not predictors of, criminality. Citing this and other social
science data, some have argued that traditional concepts of criminal liability
based on abstract notions of free will cannot be sustained because they
ignore the influence of environment. However, the determinist conception
of agency offered as an alternative is also unattractive because it conflicts
with subjective experience and treats citizens as objects of social control.
ADR is frequently implicated in these debates, but also faces its own unique
objections. One of the stickiest, advanced by Owen Fiss, is that ADR
procedures privatize disputes and fail to reinforce essential public norms.
This Article argues that ADR, reconceived through a restorative lens,
can resolve these apparent dilemmas. Part I explores the development of
ADR procedures in the criminal context and subsequent criticisms of its
alleged propensity to “privatize” public conflicts. Part II sets up the free
will and moral responsibility debate and frames the conceptual concerns in
terms of sociological data, which suggests that criminality may be
environmental. Part III charts a course between the Scylla of determinism
and the Charybdis of naïve moralism by describing a role for ADR
procedures. These procedures restore faith in and function of public norms
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by addressing not only the relationships between victims and offenders, but
the moral characters of offenders as well. ADR procedures effectively track
the social history of a criminal and his crime as a procedural avenue for
correcting the offender’s deficits by supplanting the influence of
environmental factors and developing procedural “presponses” that
engender socially-acceptable norms and provide economic and educational
opportunities. Part IV concludes that ADR is better equipped than
traditional systems to achieve real justice.
I. ADR: A RESPONSE TO THE “LITIGATION EXPLOSION” 1
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a range of nontraditional dispute
resolution processes evolved under the general umbrella of ADR 2 to
streamline dockets and harmoniously resolve problems. 3 In 1976, the
Roscoe Pound Conference, Perspectives on Justice in the Future, brought
together judges and lawyers to discuss potential procedural alternatives to
adjudication. 4 The conference aimed to highlight ADR’s consensual focus
as an advantage over crowded courts and litigious citizens. 5 The move
garnered support from Chief Justice Warren Burger, who warned that
1. Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). Compare
Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 27–28 (1986) (arguing that
higher caseloads do not indicate an increase in adversarial combat and noting that most courts “are
arenas in which most cases are resolved by negotiation”), with Dan B. Dobbs, Can You Care For People
and Still Count the Costs?, 46 MD. L. REV. 49, 53–54 (1986) (claiming that even if litigation is not
increasing, the costs are increasing, and even if the costs are not increasing, the intangible costs are
increasing). For a more extensive critique on the “litigation explosion” from many different
perspectives, see Benjamin R. Civiletti, Comments On Galanter Zeroing in on the Real Litigation
Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40 (1986); Jerry J. Phillips,
To Be or Not To Be: Reflections on Changing Our Tort System, 46 MD. L. REV. 55 (1986); Michael J.
Saks, If There Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?, 46 MD. L. REV. 63 (1986); Robert J. Samuelson,
The Litigation Explosion: The Wrong Question, 46 MD. L. REV. 78 (1986).
2. MELISSA LEWIS & LES MCCRIMMON, THE ROLE OF ADR PROCESSES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: A VIEW FROM AUSTRALIA 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/
alraesa/conferences/papers/ent_s3_mccrimmon.pdf.
3. See Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alterative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 431 (1986) (explaining that ADR aims to settle disputes
with justice and efficiency).
4. Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in
the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5–6 (1993). Roscoe
Pound delivered a speech to the American Bar Association on The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice in 1906 on judicial administration. See generally Roscoe Pound, The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES
(Kathleen M. Sampson ed., 2004). He claimed that the Anglo-American legal system was plagued with
an “individualist spirit,” a focus on litigation as a “game,” a belief in judicial supremacy, a lack of legal
philosophy to motivate the legislature to reform the law, and uncertain case law. Id. at 149–50.
5. Nader, supra note 4, at 6.
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adversarial processes were tearing the country apart and should yield to
mediation and arbitration by lawyers fulfilling their true calling as
“healers.” 6 In the following years, various ADR procedures gained attention
because they allowed courts to clear their dockets while engaging in less
adversarial proceedings. 7
Evolving ADR practices included arbitration, in which parties relied on
a third-party decision-maker to reach binding judgments; negotiation, in
which parties or their attorneys worked together to settle disputes;
mediation, which used a neutral third-party to bring about a voluntary
resolution; and settlement. 8 Other ad hoc ADR approaches developed from
this progressive movement, which differed in levels of formality, the
presence of lawyers, the role of third-party mediators, and the legal status of
any subsequent agreement. 9 These ADR procedures now often include
“hybrid” devices that borrow procedural aspects of the courtroom and
employ certain officials or quasi-officials (such as masters), private judges,
and private “neutral” individuals. 10
A. ADR in the Criminal Context
ADR procedures also further developed in the criminal context from
earlier “informal justice” programs. 11 One of the dominant mediation
forms, 12 Victim–Offender Mediation Programs, focused on restitution and
6. Burger, supra note 1, at 274.
7. Nader, supra note 4, at 6; cf. BENEDICT S. ALPER & LAWRENCE T. NICHOLS, BEYOND THE
COURTROOM 13−14 (1981) (asserting that the costs of litigation virtually eliminated the poor from
receiving any legal services and the delay due to an increase in litigation was jeopardizing the
fundamental legal rights of all). A follow-up task force of the conference published a report in 1978 that
dealt with “better means of dispute resolution, alternate forums, neighborhood justice centers, smallclaims courts, arbitration, elimination of the adversary process, interests of victims, witnesses, and
jurors, and in-prison complaint procedures.” Id. at 20. Various groups, including the American Law
Institute, the American Bar Foundation, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, the National Judicial College, the National Center for State Courts, the Office for Improvements
in the Administration of Justice (U.S. Department of Justice), and the Federal Judicial Center
contributed to the project. Id. These recommendations were included in a bill that would establish a
“dispute resolution resource center” in the Department of Justice to conduct research and extend grants
to neighborhood centers. Id.; see also Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 96-190, 94 Stat. 17 (1980)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. app.) (stating the purpose of the act is “[t]o provide financial assistance for the
development and maintenance of effective, fair, inexpensive, and expeditious mechanisms for the
resolution for minor disputes”).
8. MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 6 (1996).
9. LEWIS & MCCRIMMON, supra note 2, at 2.
10. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3, at 424–25.
11. See id. (discussing how various “informal justice mechanisms” had long played a role in
indigenous communities and other societies).
12. Mark William Bakker, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in
the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (1994). Although these two approaches are
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reconciliation through face-to-face meetings between victims and offenders
before trained mediators. 13 The goal was to provide a fair process in which
discussion would facilitate an understanding of the crime and allow for
negotiation of restitution. 14 The model program began in Canada, but
similar programs have since expanded to rural areas and large cities in the
United States, serving both juvenile and adult offenders. 15 These programs
address property crimes, like vandalism and burglary, but have also been
utilized to address negligent homicide, armed robbery, and rape. 16
Community Dispute Resolution Procedures also evolved to dispose of
minor conflicts that were clogging criminal dockets. 17 Its advocates hoped
to empower communities to resolve conflicts away from the state’s
influence and to shift the focus from the offender’s individual rights
towards community building. 18 The U.S. Department of Justice created
model Neighborhood Justice Centers in Atlanta, Kansas City, and Los
Angeles in 1977, and other community dispute resolution programs have
since developed in response to this model, working with referrals from the
community and court system through arbitration and conciliation. 19
Various other forms of criminal ADR have since developed, including
victim–offender panels, victim assistance programs, community crime
prevention programs, sentencing circles, ex-offender assistance, community
service, school programs, and specialist courts. 20 Despite their differences,
these ad hoc procedures all focus on giving the victim a voice and dominant
role in the healing process. 21 These ad hoc ADR procedures occur at
various stages of the criminal process and can diverge from or parallel the

considered the leading ADR mediation paradigms in the criminal justice context, other informal
processes were developed as alternatives to litigation. Cf. LEWIS & MCCRIMMON, supra note 2, at 1
(suggesting that circle sentencing and family group conferencing are other forms of ADR used in
Australia).
13. Bakker, supra note 12, at 1483. A small city in Ontario, Canada created the Victim–
Offender Reconciliation Program in the early 1970s to address damage done by two intoxicated
teenagers. Id. Funded by church donations and government grants and supported by some community
groups, a probation officer and church volunteer accompanied the teens when they confronted 21
victims of vandalism and handed them over to trained mediators to reach a mutual agreement of
restitution. Id. The Canadian program made its way to Elkhart, Indiana and was later adopted and
expanded in other United States communities. Id. at 1483−84.
14. Id. at 1484.
15. Id. at 1485.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1485–86.
18. Id. at 1487.
19. Id. at 1485−86.
20. LEWIS & MCCRIMMON, supra note 2, at 5.
21. Bakker, supra note 12, at 1488.
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court process. 22 As forms of ADR, they remove legal conflicts from the
courts with the general goal of benefitting all parties, reducing litigation
costs and delays, 23 and preventing subsequent legal disputes. 24 The hope of
ADR was—and continues to be—to replace justice and rights “talk” with
actual compromise and agreement away from the courts. 25
B. Privatizing Public Harm
As the ADR movement grew, Owen Fiss published his seminal article
Against Settlement. 26 He argued that ADR advocates naively painted
22. LEWIS & MCCRIMMON, supra note 2, at 5. These other ADR procedures vary considerably
in manner and substance. The prosecutor, for example, could bring to the court a guilty plea along with a
recommendation for family group conferencing or involvement with a sentencing circle, Bruce P.
Archibald, Let My People Go: Human Capital Investment and Community Capacity Building via
Meta/Regulation in a Deliberative Democracy−A Modest Contribution for Criminal Law and
Restorative Justice, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 53 (2008), both of which seek holistic
integration of victim and offender, families, and the community to “focus on an outcome agreement,” id.
at 39. Or, the jurisdiction might utilize “problem-solving” courts (which have increased since the 1980s)
that developed as an alternative to the traditional court system to deal with drug and alcohol addictions,
drunk driving, domestic violence, and child custody. Teresa W. Carns, Michael G. Hotchkin, & Elaine
M. Andrews, Therapeutic Justice in Alaska’s Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2002). The U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Drug Court Programs offers states, state courts, local courts, and units
of local governments funding to “implement treatment drug courts” that “integrate substance abuse
treatment, mandatory drug testing, sanctions and incentives, and transitional services in a judicially
supervised court setting with jurisdiction over nonviolent, substance-abusing offenders.” Bureau of
Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Court Discretionary
Program, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/drugcourts.html (last visited February 8, 2010). To
receive funding, the U.S. Department of Justice requires compliance with ten components, including:
(1) the integration of substance abuse treatment with justice system case
processing; (2) use of a non-adversarial approach where the prosecution and
defense promote public safety while protecting the right of the accused to due
process; (3) early identification and prompt placement of eligible participants; (4)
access to a continuum of treatment, rehabilitation, and related services; (5)
frequent testing for alcohol and illicit drugs; (6) a coordinated strategy among
judge, prosecution, defense and treatment providers to govern offender
compliance; (7) ongoing judicial interaction with each participant; (8) monitoring
and evaluation to measure achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness;
(9) continuing interdisciplinary education to promote effective planning,
implementation and operation; and (10) partnerships with public agencies and
community-based organizations to generate local support and enhance drug court
effectiveness.
Carns, Hotchkin, & Andrews, supra, at 8.
23. ALPER & NICHOLS, supra note 7, at 13 (arguing that problems plaguing courts include
inaccessibility because of delay and rising costs, inefficient procedures, fragmented administration, and
disregard of criminal victims).
24. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3, at 425–26.
25. See Nader, supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting that ADR proponents hoped to use these
procedures as an alternative to litigation).
26. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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settlement as a “perfect substitute for judgment” by trivializing the remedial
role of lawsuits and privatizing disputes at the cost of public justice. 27
Favoring the courts’ role in affirming public values through adjudication, 28
Fiss criticized ADR as highly individualistic and inadequate to public
purposes because it removed the “passive umpire” judge from the
resolution process and reduced or eliminated the role of important public
norms and individual rights in favor of purely private dispute resolution. 29
The “Imbalance of Power,” 30 “Absence of Authoritative Consent,” 31 lack of
“Continuing Judicial Involvement,” 32 and resulting “Justice Rather Than
Peace” 33 were downfalls of the ADR process that Fiss thought were better
handled by adjudication. 34
At the heart of his criticism, Fiss claimed that ADR eliminated the
social function of lawsuits because, while peace between the parties might
be achieved, society was left without a remedy. 35 Adjudication, he posited,
positively exploited its very foundations—using public resources, public
officials (chosen by the public), public power, and a public forum—to
legitimize, expand, and reinforce core public values captured by the
Constitution and democratically produced in statutes. 36 Settlement, by
removing disputes from public forums, deprived courts, as reactive
27. Id. at 1085. Fiss’s larger area of study focuses on the role of the federal courts in pursuing
equality for black Americans. See Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
51 (2003), for a discussion of Fiss’s larger scholarly focus. His scholarship develops this inquiry through
two avenues: developing an “equality theory” and its doctrinal implications and then opining on “the
forms of justice,” particularly as to the role of judges in pursuing public norms. Id. at 52. I will limit my
inquiry to his thoughts on the role of courts in pursuing public norms.
28. OWEN M. FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 10−13 (2003).
29. Id. at 15.
30. Fiss, supra note 26, at 1076.
31. Id. at 1078.
32. Id. at 1082.
33. Id. at 1085. This notion of “justice” as function of engagement of state authority and public
norms can be traced back at least to Kant. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, INTRODUCTION TO THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993).
34. Fiss, supra note 26, at 1088–89.
35. Id. at 1085.
36. Id.; see also FISS, supra note 28, at 58. Fiss states:
[I]f we accept the privatization of all ends or deny the government the power to
realize the values that may fairly be deemed public, we will impoverish our social
existence and undermine important institutional arrangements. The judiciary would
be without the means to protect against the threats posed by the bureaucracies of the
modern state, and the Constitution would be debased. The Constitution would be
seen not as the embodiment of a public morality but simply as an instrument of
political organization—distributing power and prescribing the procedures by which
that power is to be exercised. Such a development must be resisted and can be, but to
do so we must first rediscover the meaning and value of our public life.
Id.
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institutions, of the chance to create justice, educate society, and fulfill the
government’s social duty. 37 The legitimacy of courts, and therefore the law,
depended upon the capacity to perform, but Fiss argued that settlement
impinged on exactly that capacity. 38 Settlement eliminated the “publicity
principle” at the center of “democratic political morality” by merely
publicizing—if at all—the terms of the settlement without professing how it
was reached, reasserting public norms, or recognizing underlying moral
responsibility. 39
Fiss was not the only critic of ADR. Others argued that because ADR
was largely the result of strong persuasive rhetoric—“spearheaded by the
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court”—it was not backed by empirical
data but by broad generalizations supporting a procedural framework
insufficient to address legal rights. 40 Critics maintained that ADR was a
product of “cultural imperialism” in which the Chief Justice, prominent
legal writers, and other persuasive individuals worked together to advance
rhetoric in response to a “litigation explosion,” and because they were so
influential, no one challenged their claims. 41 ADR promised a more
accessible, harmonious, 42 and efficient form of justice through which
37. Fiss, supra note 26, at 1085.
38. FISS, supra note 28, at 32. Fiss noted that courts do not operate on a consent theory: while
individuals can procedurally comment on the courts as part of upholding their civic duties, the courts
have a more distant function to legitimize the system through discharging constitutional mandates. Id.
As part of this process, it is necessary—even beneficial—to the system when individuals pursue lawsuits
so that the court can vindicate the constitutional framework. Id. at 53. Dispute resolution, on the other
hand, privatizes values through “any set of rules that would, in the future, minimize disputes or
maximize the satisfaction of private ends.” Id. at 52.
39. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2648
(1995); see also Don Ellinghausen, Jr., Justice Trumps Peace: The Enduring Relevance of Owen Fiss’s
Against Settlement, RUTGERS CONFLICT RESOL. L.J. at 20, http://pegasus.rutgers.edu/~rcrlj/
articlespdf/ellinghausen.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2010) (comparing the criticisms of both ADR and
traditional settlement proponents). There is also debate about a number of factors—together called the
“substantive process” claim—that affect the legitimacy and justice of the ADR process. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement
Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 489, 497–98 (1985) (discussing the “substantive process” claim).
Professor Menkel-Meadow uses the “substantive process” claim in the sense that it was used by
Professor Resnik. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 396–97 (1982)
(suggesting that settlement slows the process). Professor Menkel-Meadow alleges that removing cases
from a judge’s docket not only leads to insufficient justice and a “failed chance” to legitimize the law,
but also may lead to larger social injustice in terms of removing potential appellate case law. MenkelMeadow, supra at, 488.
40. See Nader, supra note 4, at 7.
41. Id. at 8−9.
42. Critics, including Laura Nader, alleged that ADR was “sold” easily to the public because it
appeared to track a “harmony ideology” that was focused on pacification, but was actually a type of
“coercive harmony” that “discourage[ed] newcomers to the courts” and “invoked danger.” LAURA
NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW 52–54 (2002).
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parties could maintain control while dealing with conflict. 43 These critics
argued, however, that ADR was incapable of communicating public norms
precisely because its primary focus was “facilitat[ing]” settlement and
creating a dialogue between parties instead of addressing legal rights. 44
Without confronting social realities and root causes of race, class, and
gender, 45 it would be impossible for ADR’s private focus to adequately
perform the court’s social function. 46 Therefore, according to these critics,
ADR’s ascendency threatened—and still threatens—the decline of public
law and the protections of public institutions. 47
These are legitimate concerns. A turn to ADR, however, does not
necessarily entail a trade-off with public norms. To the contrary, criminal
ADR procedures have the potential, under proper theoretical guidance, to
answer Fiss’s concerns in extending public norms while achieving
significant restorative advantages for offenders and their communities. Part
II finds ground for such a theory in unexpected territory: debates about free
will and responsibility.
II. FREE WILL––RESPONSIBILITY AS A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
A. Free Will and Responsibility
Free will is a traditional prerequisite for both moral and criminal
responsibility. 48 From Aristotle’s perspective, praise or blame is appropriate
43. BENNETT & HERMANN, supra note 8, at xi.
B.
HARRINGTON,
SHADOW
JUSTICE:
THE
IDEOLOGY
AND
44. CHRISTINE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT 73–74 (1985) (“In the alternatives movement
legal resources are not rights, they are institutions to facilitate negotiation and mediation.”).
45. Nader, supra note 4, at 5, 10–11.
46. Fiss, supra note 26, at 1085, 1089.
47. See id. at 1085–89 (suggesting that ADR infringes on the court’s ability to vindicate
constitutional ideals).
48. KANT, supra note 33, at 41–42.
The capacity for desiring in accordance with concepts, insofar as the ground
determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called the
capacity for doing or refraining from doing as one pleases. Insofar as it is joined
with one’s consciousness of the capacity to bring about its object by one’s action
it is called the capacity for choice; if it is not joined with this consciousness its act
is called a wish. The capacity for desire whose inner determining ground, hence
even what pleases it, lies within the subject’s reason is called the will. The will is
therefore the capacity for desire considered not so much in relation to action (as
the capacity for choice is) but rather in relation to the ground determining choice
to action. The will itself, strictly speaking, has no determining ground; insofar as
it can determine the capacity for choice, it is instead practical reason itself.
Insofar as reason can determine the capacity of desire in general, not only
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only if an action is voluntary. 49 According to Immanuel Kant, responsibility
presupposes free will, liberated from “foreign [determining] causes.” 50
Basing culpability and punishment on “luck,” or conditions outside of an
individual’s control seems unfair; 51 if an individual is not reckless,
negligent, or malicious in causing harm, it is not her fault and she should
not be blamed. 52
Limiting the imposition of blame and punishment to acts of free will
presupposes an individual’s capacity to deliberate, control, or choose
behavior. 53 But determinists challenge this supposition, arguing that
clusters of environmental factors constrain choice. 54 In Skepticism About
choice but also mere wish can be included under the will. That choice which can
be determined by pure reason is called free choice. That which can be determined
only by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be animal choice
(arbitrium brutum). Human choice, however, is a capacity for choice that can
indeed be affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore of itself (apart
from an acquired aptitude of reason) not pure but can still be determined to
actions by pure will.
Id.
49. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS III. I. 1109b3–1114a31 (Joe Sachs trans., 2002).
50. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 63
(Thomas K. Abbott trans., Bobbs-Merrill, 1977) (1785).
51. B.A.O. Williams & T. Nagel, Moral Luck, in 50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOCIETY, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 115, 140 (1976); see also A.J. AYER, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
271 (1965) (“For a man is not thought to be morally responsible for an action that it was not in his
power to avoid.”).
52. See Gideon Rosen, Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, 18 PHIL. PERSP. 295, 296
(2004) (“And yet if it is clear that you had taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the injury—if it
is clear that [you] were neither negligent nor reckless nor malicious in causing the harm—then there is
another sense in which you are not morally responsible for the injury.”).
53. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at III. I. 1109b3–1114b31; see Williams & Nagel, supra note
51, at 140. Williams and Nagel assert:
They are all opposed by the idea that one cannot be more culpable or estimable
for anything than one is for that fraction of it which is under one’s control. It
seems irrational to take or dispense credit or blame for matters over which a
person has no control, or for their influence on results over which he has partial
control. Such things may create the conditions for action, but action can be judged
only to the extent that it goes beyond these conditions and does not just result
from them.
Id.
54. See Williams & Nagel, supra note 51, at 146. Williams and Nagel continue:
The area of genuine agency, and therefore of legitimate moral judgment, seems
to shrink under this scrutiny to an extensionless point. Everything seems to result
from the combined influence of factors, antecedent and posterior to action, that
are not within the agent’s control. Since he cannot be responsible for them, he
cannot be responsible for their results . . . .
Id.; ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at III. I. 1110a1–5. Aristotle states:
Now it seems that unwilling acts are the ones that happen by force or through
ignorance, a forced act being one of which the source is external, and an act is of
this sort in which the person acting, or acted upon, contributes nothing, for
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Moral Responsibility, for instance, Gideon Rosen questions the rational
foundations of moral responsibility. 55 He begins with the common law rule
that an individual cannot be responsible if he acts from ignorance, like
mistaking arsenic for sugar when making tea. 56 Imposing liability for such
mistakes requires proving culpability for the error itself, such as recklessly
putting arsenic in a sugar container. 57 This finding requires proof of some
failure to fulfill a “procedural epistemic obligation,” or a precaution that a
“reasonably prudent person in [his] circumstances would have taken,” to
avoid the mistake by acquiring accurate knowledge. 58 These procedural
epistemic duties ensure “that when the time comes to act, one will know
what one ought to know.” 59
According to Rosen, assigning responsibility based on failure to
discharge these procedural epistemic duties initiates a regress with each
mistake implicating a prior mistake and procedural failure. 60 Culpability
can only lie if that regress ends with a conscious failure to perform an
epistemic duty. 61 That is, if X is to be responsible for the bad act, the
responsibility must be, what Rosen calls, an akratic act. 62 Rosen contends
that because most crimes are derivative of blameless mistakes or external
events that impact the agent’s assessments and weighing of normative
considerations, no such point exists. 63 That is, the agent is ultimately
blameless as most crimes are due to errors of fact, law, moral principles, or
value judgments. 64 Rosen’s insight, like those of other determinists,
instance if a wind carries one off somewhere, or people do who are in control.
Id. For example, in the case of compulsion or insanity, punishment could be excused because the agent
did not have full control, P. F. STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment, in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT
AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 2–3 (Methuen & Co. 1980) (1974), but beyond “abnormality,” if some outside
factor caused an individual’s act (like a gun pointed at her head), the possibility of assigning moral
responsibility is heavily contested because she might not have freely chosen to act in a certain way,
compare AYER, supra note 51, at 279 (suggesting that she could be responsible).
55. Rosen, supra note 52, at 295.
56. Id. at 299−300.
57. Id. at 300−01.
58. Id. at 301 (emphasis omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 303.
61. Id. at 309–10.
62. Id. at 309.
63. Id. at 308.
64. Id. at 304. In the case of ignorance of morals, for example, the ancient slave owner is only
blameworthy if he is culpable for knowing that owning slaves is immoral, but proving that he should
know this—that he has a procedural epistemic duty—is very difficult. See id. Perhaps his parents taught
him slavery was moral; ignorance is then not necessarily his fault and moral culpability is unassignable.
We can never truly know whether he had a procedural epistemic duty, according to Rosen, to seek
behind the information his parents gave him. Thus, we cannot confidently assign moral responsibility to
him. Id. at 304–05. The same holds true for value judgments. The individual cannot be culpable if he
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deliberately shakes and complicates common notions of free will; the
theoretically troublesome point is further amplified by recent studies on
socioeconomic factors associated with crime.
B. Social Science Environmental Risk Factors
Mounting sociological data, which suggests a correlation between
environmental risk factors and criminal formation, 65 supports the view of
determinist skeptics of free will. That is, if environmental—causal—risk
factors may “predict the onset, continuity, or escalation of [an individual’s]
violence,” moral responsibility might crumble. 66 In Rosen’s language, these
factors cause blameless ignorance of moral principles, misweighed
judgments, or may interfere with the fulfillment of procedural epistemic
duties. 67 For those shaped by these environmental factors, there may be
good reason to question common notions of blame and responsibility. 68
In 2001, the Surgeon General issued a report on youth violence, which
identified risk factors that place particular individuals at a higher risk of
committing a criminal act. 69 The factors that perpetuate youth violence
included: (1) individual risk factors, such as low IQ, aggressive behavior,
psychological conditions, and substance abuse; (2) family risk factors, such
as low parental involvement, broken homes, parental monitoring, low
socioeconomic status, neglect, and antisocial parents; (3) peer group risk
factors, such as association with delinquent peers, involvement in gangs,
and social rejection; (4) community risk factors, such as neighborhood
crime, drugs, and neighborhood disorganization; and (5) school risk factors,
such as poor attitude and performance and academic failure. 70

thoughtfully considered whether or not to steal a loaf of bread to feed the homeless, but ultimately chose
to do so because he decided while morally wrong, the non-moral benefit was greater. Id. at 305–06. He
rationally deliberated—leaving him procedurally blameless—so is not at fault if he believed he should
steal the loaf of bread. Id.
65. See OFFICE FOR THE SURGEON GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2001) [hereinafter YOUTH
VIOLENCE], available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/toc.html (follow “Risk
Factors for Youth Violence” hyperlink under Chapter 4) (reporting that “scientists have identified a
number of [risk factors] that put children and adolescents at risk of violent behavior”).
66. Id.
67. Rosen, supra note 52, at 304.
68. See id. at 311 (“If he is concerned with such matters he should presumably also take steps
to revise or reconceive any social practice whose justification depends on the assumption that people are
morally responsible for their bad actions—one salient candidate for which is the practice of criminal
punishment.”).
69. YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 65.
70. Id.

574

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 34:563

As the study suggests, these risk factors crucially affect a child’s social
development, asserting their influence internally on moral judgments, value
weighing, and behaviors. 71 Children learn how to interact in society—
physically, mentally, emotionally—creating their identities by internalizing
norms, attitudes, and behaviors of their communities. 72 Instead of being
uncaused causes, sociological theory suggests that children become
products of their society, 73 acting towards others based on assigned
meanings that arise from prior interaction. 74 If we accept this premise, then,
risk factors affect what Rosen might call a child’s “normative ignorance” 75
because values taught in the home are tied intimately to the child’s
behaviors. This insight complicates traditional notions of free will.
The debate over free will and determinism may appear as intractable as
the debate between ADR advocates and skeptics like Fiss. However,
holding the two debates in one hand, a solution begins to emerge. We can

see the seeds of such a solution in the suggested revisions to the
Model Penal Code (MPC).

71. See George H. Mead, Play, the Game, and the Generalized Other, in SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 222, 225 (Lewis A. Coser & Bernard Rosenberg eds., 1989). Mead states:
The self-conscious human individual, then, takes or assumes the organized
social attitudes of the given social group or community . . . to which he belongs,
toward the social problems of various kinds which confront that group or
community at any given time, and which arise in connection with the
correspondingly different social projects or organized co-operative enterprises in
which that group or community as such is engaged; and as an individual
participant in these social projects or co-operative enterprises, he governs his own
conduct accordingly.
Id.
72. Id. at 223–24.
73. Id. at 224 (“It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the
behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on . . . for it is in this form that the social
process or community enters as a determining factor into the individual’s thinking.”).
74. George H. Mead, The I and the Me, in THEORIES OF SOCIETY 163, 165 (Talcott Parsons et
al. eds., 1961).
75. Rosen, supra note 52, at 304. For example, while Rosen considers an ancient slaveholder
who has no false factual opinions about his slaves, but believes it to be morally permissible to buy and
sell them, id., we might consider a child with an abusive father who has internalized the norm that
physical violence is acceptable. That internalized norm might result in the child’s use of violence to
solve problems in school if he is never taught by some other source that violence is an unacceptable
reaction. Rosen, though, claims he can be culpable if he is responsible for the moral ignorance from
which he acts. Id. It seems in our case that the child probably cannot be held morally responsible
because at a young age he did not have a duty to fulfill the procedural epistemic duty of learning that
violence is unacceptable from some outside source.
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C. The Model Penal Code’s Suggested Revisions
The recent suggested revisions to the MPC shed light on this debate
and suggest novel ways of looking at the purposes behind sentencing. The
American Law Institute (ALI) has recognized a need to revise the
sentencing provisions of the old MPC to incorporate determinate
sentencing, which moves away from solely utilitarian justification for
punishment and toward a just deserts philosophy supplemented with
76
prisoner reform. After nearly a decade, the full membership of the ALI
approved Tentative Draft No. 1 (Draft) in 2007, a compilation of suggested
revisions that included changes that would better define the purposes of
77
sentencing. The Draft states:
The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable
to all official actors in the sentencing system, are: (a) in decisions
affecting the sentencing of individual offenders: (i) to render
sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to
the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the
blameworthiness of offenders; (ii) when reasonably feasible, to
achieve offender rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation
of dangerous offenders, restoration of crime victims and
communities, and reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding
community, provided these goals are pursued within the
boundaries of proportionality in subsection (a)(i); and (iii) to
render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve the
78
applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) . . . .

The Draft would limit sentencing to a range that accounts for the
severity of the offense, the harm done to victims, and the offender’s
79
blameworthiness. But it would allow, “when reasonably feasible” within
this just range, for sentencing that includes aspects of rehabilitation,
80
deterrence, incapacitation, restoration, and reintegration. Most notably,
the Draft incorporates room for restorative justifications, a recent trend
emphasized among states that are seeking to move away from purely

76. Christopher Slobogin, Introduction to the Symposium on the Model Penal Code’s
Sentencing Proposals, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665, 666 (2009).
77. Id. at 670; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1
2007).
78. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1 2007).
79. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(i).
80. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii).
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retributive and utilitarian approaches to punishment and towards alternate
81
paths of prisoner reform.
Although it focuses on “just deserts,” the revision rejects the view that
desert should be the only determinant or that “there is a single correct
82
retributive punishment for each offender.” Instead, it assumes that society
does not “have adequate ‘moral calipers’ to reach such definitive conclusions
and that, at best, [society] can merely ascertain when a punishment is clearly
83
excessive or insufficient on desert grounds.” As Rosen might suggest, we
cannot account for a constellation of causal factors to locate the offender as a

81. See, e.g., id. § 1.02(2) rep. n. cmt. b(2). The Comment to the Reporter’s Notes states:
Restorative-justice principles are mentioned in a growing number of
contemporary sentencing codes. [citing] Alaska Stat. § 12.55.005(7) (2006) (“In
imposing sentence, the court shall consider . . . the restoration of the victim and
the community”); Arkansas Code § 16-90-801(a)(3), (4) (2006) (“primary
purposes of sentencing” include “restitution or restoration to victims of crime to
the extent possible and appropriate” and “[t]o assist the offender toward
rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen”); Del. Code
Title 11, § 6580 (2006) (goals for sentencing commission to consider when
developing sentencing guidelines include “[r]estoration of the victim as nearly as
possible to the victim’s preoffense status”); Kan. Stat. § 74-9101(b)(12) (2006)
(sentencing commission shall “develop a program plan which includes
involvement of business and industry in the public or other social or fraternal
organizations for admitting back into the mainstream those offenders who
demonstrate both the desire and ability to reconstruct their lives during their
incarceration or during conditional release”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.019(7) (2006)
(“Courts shall retain discretion . . . to order restorative justice methods, when
applicable”); id. § 558.019(8) (“If the imposition or execution of a sentence is
suspended, the court may order any or all of the following restorative justice
methods,” including victim restitution, offender treatment, mandatory community
service, work release in local facilities and community-based residential and
nonresidential programs); Mont. Code § 46-18-101(2)(c) (2006) (among other
goals, the correctional and sentencing policy of the state is to “provide restitution,
reparation, and restoration to the victim of the offense”); N.Y. Penal Law §
1.05(5) (2006) (one purpose of criminal code is “[t]o provide for an appropriate
public response to particular offenses, including consideration of the
consequences of the offense for the victim, including the victim’s family, and the
community”); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1514 (2006) (purposes of criminal-justice
system include “restitution and reparation”).
Id.
82. Slobogin, supra note 76, at 671.
83. Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) cmt. b. (Tentative Draft No. 1 2007). The
Comment states:
[M]oral intuitions about proportionate penalties in specific cases are almost
always rough and approximate . . . . Even when a decisionmaker is acquainted
with the circumstances of a particular crime, and has a rich understanding of the
offender, it is seldom possible, outside of extreme cases, for the decisionmaker to
say that the deserved penalty is precisely x.
Id.
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genuine akratic actor in order to confidently determine culpability and impose
some definitive punishment. According to social scientists relying on the
Surgeon General’s data, the individual’s environment might have influenced
his moral development, leading him to commit the crime. The Draft, arguably
then, aims to allow latitude in sentencing through secondary concerns that
include restoration, but practically “place[s] a ceiling on government’s
84
legitimate power to attempt to change an offender . . . .”
This insight suggests that a solely utilitarian or solely retributive
punishment system is inadequate; rather, the revisions suggest that we
should utilize a host of justifications to best suit the individual offender
within an appropriate range. The Draft’s understanding of the role played
by rehabilitative, reintegrative, and restorative approaches in sentencing and
punishment offers one potential way that concerns about free will and moral
responsibility can be addressed in sentencing. This understanding plants
more promising seeds for an alternative theory of criminal sentencing that
considers the influence of environment. However, it might not provide
adequate emphasis on all of these various sentencing goals, at least in some
instances, and does not address the concerns advanced by those like Owen
Fiss about the consequences of some of these alternative considerations.
The suggested revisions begin to explore the role that restorative
justice, in particular, and other justifications ought to play in utilizing the
debate over free will and determinism to construct a theory of criminal
justice. Part III expands upon these seeds and holds the debate over free
will and determinism, along with the debate between ADR advocates and
its skeptics in one hand, to create a more adequate solution. Literature on
restorative justice is used to argue that criminal ADR, by addressing the
private failures of offenders in light of environmental risk factors,
entrenches public norms by simultaneously establishing a private role for
public norms in the consciousness of offenders and extending those norms
through an effort to restore the offender and his community.
III. CRIMINAL ADR, COGNITIVE TRAINING, AND PUBLIC NORMS
Determinists, supported by social science data that documents a close
correlation between environment and crime, argue that the assumptions of
free will grounding criminal blame and punishment are a fiction. 85 Critics
of ADR argue that these procedures privatize public wrongs, and therefore
fail to reinforce and extend both public norms of conduct and commitments
84. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) cmt. b. (Tentative Draft No. 1 2007).
85. See supra Part II.
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to justice embedded in court procedures. 86 However, criminal ADR avoids
both objections by embracing both. Social science data on criminality
suggests that environmental factors often interfere with the process by
which agents internalize public norms. Where this occurs, blame—from
Rosen’s standpoint—might be inappropriate. 87 Nonetheless, that does not
mean blame is impossible. 88 Rather, the challenge is to construct a criminal
punishment system that restores offenders to a condition of
blameworthiness by employing a connection to public norms that allows for
future assignment of culpability. The crucial insight of criminal ADR is that
the best means to this end is through the offender’s victims and his
immediate community. 89 Properly conceived, under a restorative lens, these
procedures also have the capacity to restore the offender’s breach by
reinforcing and extending the mutual respect and empathy embedded in
both the criminal law and more familiar court procedures. 90 To see these
connections and possibilities, it is first necessary to briefly revisit the
problem of determinism.
A. Public Commitments to Free Will:
Constructing a Theory of Criminal Punishment
As A.J. Ayer has argued, there is a distinction between internal and
external constraint missing in the determinists’ arguments. 91 While the risk
factors identified by the Surgeon General may affect moral development,
they do not compel conduct from without. 92 Rather, they, at most,
determine character, constraining the offenders’ field of options and
limiting the scope of possibilities that grip their imaginations. 93 But just
86. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 26, at 1089 (viewing ADR as a “‘two track’ strategy” that
undermines American courts, which are a source of pride not shame).
87. See Rosen, supra note 52, at 296–97 (explaining that there are many reasons, “moral or
otherwise” not to blame someone).
88. Id. at 308.
89. See infra Part III.B.1.
90. See infra Parts III.B.2, III.C.
91. AYER, supra note 51, at 282.
92. Id. (suggesting that external constraints do not compel conduct).
93. See id. Ayer states:
[I]t may be said that my childhood experience, together with certain other events,
necessitates my behaving as I do. But all that this involves is that it is found to be
true in general that when people have had certain experiences as children, they
subsequently behave in certain specifiable ways; . . . It is in this way indeed that
my behaviour is explained. But from the fact that my behaviour is capable of
being explained, in the sense that it can be subsumed under some natural law, it
does not follow that I am acting under constraint.
Id.; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at II. I. 1103a11–1103b25 (describing how character, both
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because a psycho-analyst could account for violent behavior by examining
the influence of an abusive father on his son, it does not follow that the
son’s conduct was not free. 94 Environmental effects on consciousness,
therefore, do not preclude the possibility of free will. 95
In Freedom and Resentment, P.F. Strawson makes a similar point. 96 He
argues that the concept of responsibility derives from reactive attitudes—
those judgments of resentment and praise which are central to our most
basic personal relationships and, thus, essential to existence in society. 97
Strawson contends that normatively colored reactive attitudes should not be
suspended, except in a limited number of circumstances, because doing so
would upset basic conditions of civilized society and impoverish public and
private life. 98 He recognizes that situations exist in which reactive attitudes
are inappropriate, as when dealing with what he calls “psychologically
abnormal” individuals. 99 As a basic social premise and to preserve deeply
held and socially useful patterns of conduct, however, these situations must
be the exception, not the rule. 100
Ayer and Strawson’s insights are crucial for setting criminal ADR in
the proper theoretical context. Strawson’s key intuition is that judgments
about the appropriateness of reactive attitudes are internal to basic social
processes, 101 and thus, reactive attitudes of blame and praise are
themselves justified, or at least essential, to all levels of social
relationships. 102 Therefore, even if rationally skeptical, determinism should
be rejected as the foundation for public norms and practices, including the
criminal law, because to do otherwise would reject social existence and
virture and vice, is developed through habit).
94. See AYER, supra note 51, at 282 (“But from the very fact that my behaviour is capable of
being explained, in the sense that it can be subsumed under some natural law, it does not follow that I
am acting under constraint.”). For example, we could say that the child who responds to a problem with
a classmate by resorting to violence was influenced by the abusive behavior he learned from his father.
It does not follow, however, that he was constrained to hit the classmate. Because he could have acted
otherwise, Ayer suggests that he was not acting under constraint. Id.; see supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
95. See AYER, supra note 51, at 282 (noting that one could choose otherwise if constrained).
96. STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 1−25.
97. See id. at 24 (“But an awareness of variety of forms should not prevent us from
acknowledging also that in the absence of any forms of these attitudes it is doubtful whether we should
have anything that we could find intelligible as a system of human relationships, as human society.”).
98. Id. at 13.
99. See id. at 7 (suggesting that situations exist in which an actor did not mean to perform an
act and reactive attitudes are inappropriate); id. at 8 (noting also situations exist in which an actor
“wasn’t himself” or was psychologically abnormal or underdeveloped and attitudes are suspended).
100. Id. at 12–13.
101. Id. at 16–17.
102. Id. at 11–12.
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intimate
human
relationships in favor of isolation 103 and an impoverished life of moral
solipsism. 104
This is not to say that environmental conditions that may affect agency
have no role in shaping reactive attitudes or the public and private
responses to wrongdoing. They surely do. 105 For instance, the appropriate
reactive attitude to one accused of stealing a jug of milk might initially be
resentment. That resentment is—and should be—mollified by learning that
the accused did so to provide for his two children. 106 Even more so were we
to discover that the reason he had to steal was because he did not have a
steady income due to dropping out of high school to support his ailing
single mother and three siblings. Applying Strawson’s vital insight, then,
suggests that the focus of justice must address both failures—the offender’s
violation of public norms and community’s failure to inculcate the offender
with proper values—while allocating room for blame and responsibility for
public values.
Among the range of considerations that do and ought to affect reactive
103. Id. at 11–13.
104. Id. at 15. Underlying this insight is the idea that individuals learn to assign others a “virtual
social identity” based on shared communal norms that allows him to impose expected behaviors on
others. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2 (Simon &
Schuster 1963). When the individual’s “actual social identity” fails to live up to these expectations, the
outsider experiences Strawson’s reactive attitudes. It is impossible to extract the reactive attitude from
the situation, except in the case of a child or “deranged individual,” STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 8−10,
because of the social network in which we develop shared values and norms. As Strawson vehemently
asserts, the external claim that a behavior was causally determined has no effect on the reaction. Id. at 18.
105. See STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 21–22. Strawson states:
Indignation . . . tend[s] to inhibit or at least to limit our goodwill towards the
object of these attitudes, tend[s] to promote an at least partial and temporary
withdrawal of goodwill; they do so in proportion as they are strong; and their
strength is in general proportioned to what is felt to be the magnitude of the injury
and to the degree to which the agent’s will is identified with, or indifferent to, it. .
. . The partial withdrawal of goodwill which these attitudes entail, the
modification they entail of the general demand that another should, if possible, be
spared suffering, is, rather, the consequence of continuing to view him as a
member of the moral community; only as one who has offended against its
demands.
Id.; cf. Alan Strudler, The Power of Expressive Theories of Law, 60 MD. L. REV. 492, 493 (2001)
(arguing that expressive theories of law focus on “examining the logic of moral emotions and passions
whose proper functioning may be essential to our identity and integrity as a moral community”).
106. See STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 7. Strawson states:
[L]et us consider what sorts of special considerations might be expected to modify
or mollify this feeling or remove it altogether. . . . To the first group belong all
those which might give occasion for the employment of such expressions as ‘He
didn’t mean to’, ‘He hadn’t realized’, ‘He didn’t know’ . . . ‘He couldn’t help it’
. . . ‘He had to do it’, ‘It was the only way’, ‘They left him no alternative’ . . . .
Id.
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attitudes are conditions that limit an agent’s ability to make the choices
required by public norms. 107 Normal criminal procedures fail to address
these concerns because they either deny agency and use the offender as a
means to an end of stable social order, 108 or they assume full responsibility
without seriously engaging the far more complicated constituents of
common reactive attitudes that provide the social foundations of the
criminal law. 109 From Fiss’s perspective, ADR would likewise fall victim to
the same critique because privatizing the dispute wholly leaves public
“justice undone.” 110 Structuring ADR procedures as projects of restoration
solves both problems by seeking to rehabilitate the offender and his
relationship with the community, integrating respect for public norms
where environmental factors or personal history failed to provide conditions
sufficient to internalize public morality, and confirming the preconditions
of blame and responsibility going forward. 111

107. Id. (suggesting that reactive attitudes can be mollified).
108. See COREY LANG BRETTSCHNEIDER, PUNISHMENT, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 52 (2001)
(arguing that utilitarian approaches to punishment do not seek moral justification, but pleasure and pain).
Jeremy Bentham suggested that the best decisions were those that produced benefit and prevented pain.
Id. Punishment, he theorized under an utilitarian justification, imposed pain, but was justified by
maximizing pleasure, in the form of deterrence. See id. Brettschneider states:
The pain of a life lived in prison is enormous. However, when this degree of pain
is measured against the entire life of pleasure that would be maintained among
future victims of this individual, combined with the pleasure of the families of
these future victims, utilitarians would argue that the murderer’s pain is worth
fewer utils. The principle of utility would seem to lend even more support to
punishment in cases in which others would be deterred from committing crimes as
a result of punishment.
Id.
109. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 11 (2008)
(describing how people share common ideas regarding blameworthiness); see also DAVID SHICHOR, THE
MEANING AND NATURE OF PUNISHMENT 29 (2006). Shichor states:
[T]he retributive perspective has moral implications. Central to this perspective is
the existence of a direct connection between the punishment and moral guilt. This
is based on the supposition that the law embodies the moral principles of society
that are concerned with establishing and maintaining proper social relations
among persons with respect to issues or interests typically vital to such persons.
Thus, by violating the law that embodies the moral principles of society, the
lawbreaker could be considered, by definition, to be morally guilty. Again, this
assumption is rooted in the social contract view of law reflecting a general
consensus in society concerning morality.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Fiss, supra note 26, at 1085.
111. See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 181 (1990) (arguing that a restorative paradigm
would better address crime and justice than traditional retributive justice because of restoration’s more
holistic approach, which addresses the needs of society, the victim, and the offender).
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B. Criminal ADR as Restorative Justice
A restorative lens reframes the problem and the solution in a way that
highlights how ADR emerges as a more satisfactory theory of criminal
punishment that serves public justice and embraces failures of the offender
and community. Because the problem is conceived of as a violation of
relationships, 112 the solution must seek to restore the offender with the
victim and his community. 113 ADR actualizes this solution; it connects
public norms and community relations by exploiting the community as
ultimate “consumer” 114 to produce justice and reframe the relationship
between offender and community in both personal and public terms. 115
But ADR also respects traditional notions of blame and responsibility
by addressing the damage done by forcing the offender to take moral
responsibility for his actions and make amends, 116 while also attending to
environmental factors through rehabilitation and reintegration.117
Reactively, the focus is no longer on traditional blame or deterrence, but on
using the social history of the crime as a procedural avenue to correct the
offender’s deficits. Proactively, ADR programs could also be utilized to
supplant the influence of “risk factors” by developing procedural
“presponses” 118 that engender socially-acceptable norms and provide
economic and educational opportunities, thereby correcting social failures
to support character development. 119 In this way, “justice” can be achieved
by moving beyond utilitarianism and retribution to restore norms and
address internal systemic problems.
1. Connection Between Public Norms and Community Relationships
Under the restorative justice paradigm, the community becomes a
112. Id. Contra id. at 82 (arguing that the retributive paradigm defines crime as an offense
against the state).
113. Id. at 186. Contra id. at 82 (arguing that the retributive paradigm structures “justice” to
establish blame and inflict punishment).
114. PAUL H. HAHN, EMERGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 134 (1998) (“The concept that the
community must be viewed as the ultimate ‘customer’ and as a true partner in the production of justice
is probably the first and major aspect of restorative justice that sets it apart from the traditional justice
system.”).
115. See infra Part III.B.1.
116. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
117. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
118. Thanks are owed to Professor Gray for suggesting this term to represent types of criminal
ADR “proactive responses.”
119. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
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“partner” 120 in producing justice and publicizing norms better than
adjudication. The offender is not pitted against the state—as he would be
in the courtroom—but set in a cooperative dialogue with his
community. 121 Reframed as such, ADR feeds off of the Strawsonian
insight that attitudes are natural responses to a harm, 122 but argues further
that the community must restore public norms, instead of the state or
judge. The shifted focus recognizes that the criminal acted contrary to an
expectation, which resulted in the harm, but reaches beyond pure blame
and punishment 123 to restore core public norms. Only the reactive
attitudes internal to the process of moral judgment, as Strawson would
suggest, can correct the harm and the offender. 124
Procedurally, the “passive” judge interpreting public norms from his
bench, is replaced with community members who interact with the offender
to inculcate “correct” norms, behaviors, and attitudes. 125 Similar to a child
learning appropriate behavioral responses from birth, the community
“restores” the offender with appropriate public norms. 126 The natural
processes of social norm development, instead of the external procedural
court system, better reinforce public norms. 127
Not only is the offender forced to reexamine public values personal to
him and confront the consequences of his action, but society is forced to
120. HAHN, supra note 114, at 134.
121. ZEHR, supra note 111, at 181–82 (suggesting that the focus is on the relationship).
122. See STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 23.
123. See ZEHR, supra note 111, at 70−72 (arguing that the traditional retributive paradigm seeks
to determine guilt and impose punishment).
124. See Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660,
1664–65 (1985) (criticizing Fiss’s characterization of ADR and suggesting that ADR has the potential to
promote community values in redressing conflicts). Strawson claims that optimists and pessimists both
“over-intellectualize” the moral responsibility debate by looking outside the general structure of human
attitudes and feelings. STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 23. Thus, the proper way of addressing reactive
attitudes and moral judgment must be to make them appropriate through criminal justice systems that
use the internal processes.
125. See generally Mead, supra note 71, at 224−25 (claiming that socialization internalizes
norms).
126. A restorative “re-socialization” into correct norms and behaviors takes place under ADR
processes.
127. Critical issues about the age and criminal background of the offender, seriousness of the
offense, and the like must be addressed further to discover which particular offenders would best be
served through this type of character development. For example, the procedures suggested here might
not be acceptable for crimes as severe as murder or those involving sociopathic defendants, or some
repeat offenders, but could effectively be used in minor cases not involving murder and juvenile school
disturbances. The limits of this Article, however, prohibit me from adequately investigating these
questions and the scope of crimes and offenders amenable to these processes, and it is left open for the
future development of a taxonomy that accounts for these differences. See Donald G. Gifford, A
Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1985) for the
creation of a related taxonomy of negotiation.
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calibrate reactive attitudes and reaffirm public norms. 128 By participating in
the process, society is forced to view the offender as a “human,” not as
simply one with an evil “stigma.” 129 Thus, reactive attitudes are addressed
directly through confrontation with the offender; 130 the separation between
label and person—the lessening of negative reactive attitudes, or conversion
of properly negative reactive attitudes to proactive attitudes focusing on
potential for reform—allows for a fuller acceptance after rehabilitation. By
playing a part in the offender’s internalization of proper norms, society
reconstructs the relationship in public terms and “publicizes” norms for
themselves better than a judge. 131
2. Addressing the Environmental Damage
Not only does the restorative lens allow us to view ADR as a restorer
of public norms, 132 but it also respects blame and responsibility by
addressing the damage done by offender and community. 133 Utilitarian
approaches to criminal punishment may fail to fully respect autonomy by
using the offender as a means 134 and retributive approaches may assign
excessive weight to thick notions of moral responsibility. 135 Restorative
approaches, however, confront the reality of social conditions with the aim
of achieving a fully functional social relationship between offender, victim,
and society by forcing offenders to confront their wrongful conduct 136 and
then by mending environmental risk factors. 137
a. Offenders take moral responsibility
The scheme hinges on the offender’s moral responsibility, in the form
128. See STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 21–22 (noting that reactive attitudes can be calibrated).
129. See GOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 2–3 (writing about the imposition of stigma).
130. See HAHN, supra note 114, at 137 (“Offenders must feel that they are being held
accountable, and the community must be in agreement that this is in fact taking place. Offenders must
experience ‘shaming’ for what they have done, but as soon as the shaming phase is finished, their
reintegration into the community must be emphasized.”).
131. Obvious economic issues and questions about funding arise in this discussion. These issues
rightfully deserve fuller treatment, but if an effective model could be developed, based on the seeds
planted here, as an alternative to adjudication and imprisonment for a particular set of offenders who
would benefit and better contribute to society after punishment, perhaps a program like this could be
sustained and the benefits would outweigh the costs.
132. See supra Part III.B.1.
133. See infra Part III.B.2.a–b.
134. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
136. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
137. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
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of understanding the consequences of his action, as measured by reactive
attitudes informed by both private interests and public norms. 138 He must
first take responsibility by acknowledging his wrong and accepting the label
of offender, and then symbolically repair the injury through the criminal
justice process to begin making social amends. 139
To recognize the consequences and be fully accountable to the victim
and community, he must understand the impact of the harm on others and
recognize his violation of public norms. 140 After accepting responsibility,141
he must make full amends 142 by addressing his indiscretions and restoring
relationships to bring the victim to closure. 143 ADR procedures allow
offenders to do so in the form of restitution, usually an economic
sanction, 144 or reparations, consisting of some sort of symbolic action that
includes denouncing the offense, vindication, reassurance, and repair. 145
Retribution, in the form of punishment, might also be proper in some
circumstances. 146
138. See ZEHR, supra note 111, at 200–01 (noting that the offender needs to understand and
acknowledge his harm).
139. Id. In an Indiana “‘juvenile reparations’” program, for example, Zehr notes that part of
recognition is in first encouraging the offender to comprehend the harm done to the victim and
community and then play a role in his own sentencing to address that harm. Id. at 201.
140. Id. at 200–01.
141. While the aim of ADR procedures is to meet these goals of understanding and
accountability, see id. at 197, not all offenders may be willing to accept this responsibility. However,
just because it may not be the most effective means of punishment for all, it still remains a viable and
promising candidate for the individual offenders it could assist. Traditional punishment and
imprisonment, therefore, may necessarily still play a role in a system that simultaneously uses criminal
ADR. But cf. Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute
Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 14 n.23 (1992) (arguing that alternative dispute resolution, in
general, “has little to say about genuine disputes, and its proposals for reform suppress conflict as often
as they resolve it”). Future research will address the types of offenders that would be best assisted with
character development in order to address genuine disputes and offer practical proposals for reform.
142. See ZEHR, supra note 111, at 197 (arguing that offenders need to accept the obligations of
their crime).
143. See id. at 195 (suggesting that the offender needs to vindicate and repair the crime).
144. HAHN, supra note 114, at 145. Restitution is appealing to the general public because it
could be used at any point in the process, would be directly related to the crime (for those offenses
involving money or services), and has been a long-used sanction. Id. Victim-offender mediation
programs, just one type of criminal ADR procedure, often require restitution and reconciliation in
addressing the harm. Bakker, supra note 12, at 1484. The only problem with restitution, however, is that
low-income offenders might not be able to make full payment of damages. HAHN, supra note 114, at
145–46.
145. ZEHR, supra note 111, at 195. Reparations normally refer to schemes that provide payment
“in cash or in kind” to a large group to amend for harm done rather than to deter future wrongdoing. Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 689, 691 (2003) (parentheses omitted).
146. ZEHR, supra note 111, at 209–10. Restorative justice approaches are normally seen as more
just than typical punishment paradigms. Id. at 209. The real question, Zehr then poses, is “whether
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b. Responsibility for core public values
ADR procedures, as revealed through the restorative lens, also address
the damage done by environmental risk factors by incorporating public
norms into the offender’s private decision-making process. Once the
offender has taken responsibility, the community can inculcate normative
considerations that determine appropriate conduct. 147 Pairing reintegration
and rehabilitation, ADR takes notice of the act’s social history in the
“correction” of the harm by altering the offender’s opinions toward the law,
the community’s attitudes toward the offender, and underlying social
conditions.
ADR procedures rehabilitate the offender to give him the tools
necessary to be an asset to society post-conviction. 148 Rehabilitation seeks
to alter the offender’s behavior and attitudes toward public norms to prevent
future crime by tailoring punishment to individual offenders. 149 It recognizes
that outside factors might have impacted the criminal act, then calls on
psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, or social workers to displace those
influences through corrective measures like education and vocational
training. 150 The future-oriented approach of rehabilitation is hesitant to
assume the offender’s full responsibility, 151 so instead focuses primarily on
affecting change in the offender’s character to prevent future harm. 152
For the incorporation of public norms into the offender’s private
decision-making process to be fully successful, ADR procedures ease the
offender’s acceptance into society. 153 Reintegration focuses on changing
reactive attitudes toward the offender as well as social patterns that produce
criminal behaviors to reach full incorporation into society after

punishment intended as punishment has a place.” Id. He suggests that punishment for purposes of pain
should not be used to achieve an ends, but that “fair and legitimate” punishment might have a place if it
relates to the “original wrong.” Id. at 110.
147. Cf. HAHN, supra note 114, at 134 (arguing that the tradition of Anglo–Saxon criminal
justice has been to use punishment to maintain a “just and viable society,” but that restorative
approaches do not prohibit efforts to “empower communities” to effectuate the rule of law.).
148. See ZEHR, supra note 111, at 200 (arguing that offenders, just like victims, have needs that
must be met in order for full justice to be achieved).
149. SHICHOR, supra note 109, at 44.
150. Id.; see HAHN, supra note 114, at 103. Retroactively, probation and parole officers might
work with neighborhood groups, businesses, churches, and schools to advance program development for
the offender. Id. at 105. Under this model, the gap between “institutional” custodial, correctional staff,
and treatment would likely be lessened to take a team-based approach. Id.
151. SHICHOR, supra note 109, at 44.
152. Id. (citation omitted).
153. See HAHN, supra note 114, at 135 (internal citation omitted) (noting that a key component
of restorative justice is providing opportunities for offenders to reintegrate into the community).
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punishment. 154 The process “present[s] positive alternatives to law-violating
behavior” by encouraging healthy family ties and nourishing community
relationships that promote individual support. 155 Doing so develops the
offender’s social values in a practical way that can be utilized after
punishment. 156
c. “Presponses”
Proactively, ADR systems can further supplant the influence of “risk
factors” by developing procedural, restorative “presponses” that engender
acceptable norms and provide the means of “correct” character
development, thereby correcting social failures evidenced by, inter alia, the
Surgeon General’s identified risk factors. 157 ADR procedures operate, in
essence, as a “resocialization” into behavioral expectations, offering
positive alternatives, before risk factors produce criminality. 158
One such example is the Cristo Rey Network of high schools located
around the United States, which targets urban youth in low-income areas
who have limited educational opportunities. 159 The schools seek to give
individuals from gangs, broken homes, and poor backgrounds—all of which
are social risk factors—the opportunity to broaden their education, secure
job opportunities, and establish better economic means. 160 Students finance
their education by participating in once-a-week work-study programs
gaining experience and learning values like hard work and responsibility. 161
Programs like Cristo Rey attack clusters of risk factors to holistically
embrace youth prone to criminality. 162
154. SHICHOR, supra note 109, at 52.
155. HAHN, supra note 114, at 100. See id. at 100–06, for a more thorough explanation of how
reintegration seeks to recognize the pathology of the crime to correct the offender’s behavior going
forward.
156. Id. at 105. At times, pairing reintegration with aspects of reform could even allow for an
emphasis on communal standards that the offender must meet to become a productive member of
society through systems of rewards and punishments, surveillance, and behavior-monitoring in
correctional compliance. Id. at 103.
157. See supra Part III.B.
158. This type of ADR procedure would require funding on a proactive basis to prevent crime.
In this sense, it might require a reallocation of funds: money spent on dealing with the consequences of
crime, would instead be used to prevent crime. The change of focus, however, if these programs are
ultimately effective in preventing crime, would justify the reallocation and promote a “safer” society.
159. Cristo Rey Jesuit High School, http://www.cristorey.net/about/our_story.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Cristo Rey].
160. Id.
161. Id. This approach seems to be working well so far, with 99% of graduates accepted to two
or four year colleges. Id.
162. See YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 65 (“Risk factors usually exist in clusters, not in
isolation.”). The report, for example, suggests that abused and neglected children tended to come from
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“Presponses” connect public norms with community relationships, but
address the damage in a proactive way. “Presponses” exploit natural
reactive attitudes in response to past crime; they represent the understanding
that an act’s social history can be employed to prevent the development of
future negative reactive attitudes by correcting the risk factors revealed in
the act’s social history. If we know what might correlate with crime and
cause negative reactive attitudes, we can utilize that knowledge to make
reactive attitudes appropriate in the future—or wholly prevent negative
reactive attitudes—and work to eliminate crime altogether. 163
C. Rebutting Determinism
Skeptics might claim that ADR cannot truly “resolve” the determinist
critique. That is true in a certain respect because these procedures accept
that environmental factors play an important role in agent formation. 164
However, the connection forged between public norms and private
relationships in ADR procedures usefully shifts the focus from the past to
the future by working to restore the preconditions of reactive attitudes 165
and to establish justified assignments of responsibility. 166
The process does not eliminate blame entirely because the act could be
correlated with, rather than caused by, risk factors and the offender was not
constrained to act. 167 Rather, this process packages punishment in a more
satisfactory way. 168 While we demand a certain degree of good will from
poor, single-parent families living in disadvantaged neighborhoods with rampant violence, crime, and
drug use. Id. Programs like Cristo Rey address the Surgeon General’s warning that “[m]ore important
than any individual factor . . . is the accumulation of risk factors.” Id. The work-study program, for
example, provides strong community ties and job training, see Cristo Rey, that counteracts weak social
ties and neighborhood disorganization, see YOUTH VIOLENCE. Invested teachers and faculty who run
after-school programs, see Cristo Rey, offset gang involvement, low parental involvement, and poor
attitude or school performance, see YOUTH VIOLENCE.
163. Cristo Rey presents just one example of a proactive ADR procedure that could be used to
prevent crime altogether, or justify reactive attitudes if crime occurs in the future. Cristo Rey, supra note
159. The aim of “presponses” is to counteract environmental risk factors that lead to potential criminal
conduct at an early stage of an individual’s life. Measuring the “effectiveness” of such a system might
be impossible, but it is theoretically imaginable that we could prevent crime if we targeted—and
eliminated—these troubling factors. More research is necessary to identify other—and possibly more
effective—“presponses” that could be constructed in the most cost-effective way.
164. See ZEHR, supra note 111, at 44 (suggesting that the offender’s actions “grew out of a
history of abuse”).
165. See STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 22–23 (suggesting that conditions can change reactive
attitudes).
166. See Rosen, supra note 52, at 308–09 (suggesting that moral responsibility is possible).
167. See AYER, supra note 51, at 278, 282–83 (suggesting that the possibility of explaining
behavior does not mean that the individual acted under constraint).
168. See ZEHR, supra note 111, at 181–82 (suggesting that crime injures relationships and harms
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individuals, as part of society, reactive attitudes can—and should—be
lessened when we consider the effect of the risk factors on the individual
and the act. 169 ADR does not forgo reactive attitudes of condemnation
entirely. 170 Neither does it fully embrace hard moralism by refusing to
consider sympathetic reactions that underlie its focus on compassionate
punishment. 171 The decision to use ADR instead represents a compromise
between reactive attitudes and sympathy that reflects our own epistemic
humility. 172 Because we cannot fully know the role that environmental
factors played in shaping a criminal response, the focus should be on
correcting the influence of those environmental risk factors through
rehabilitation and reintegration to inculcate public norms as central features
of public agency going forward, instead of harsh, punitive punishment. 173
Besides lessening punishment, ADR shifts the focus to the act’s social
history to address the damage done by the environmental risk factors. By
rehabilitating and reintegrating the offender with proper public norms for
private decision-making and developing “presponses” to thwart the
influence of risk factors, the scheme sets the stage for future appropriate
reactive attitudes. 174 ADR displaces the “incorrect” normative and
misweighed judgments presented by the risk factors that might interfere
with the fulfillment of procedural epistemic duties. 175 For example,
programs like Cristo Rey counteract the influence of risk factors by
both offender and victim).
169. STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 7, 16; see id. at 7 (“[Various situations] invite us to see the
injury as one for which he was not fully, or at all, responsible.”).
170. See ZEHR, supra note 111, at 194–95 (“Victims feel violated by crime, and these violations
generate needs. Communities feel violated as well . . . and they have needs too. Since one cannot ignore
the public dimensions of crime, the justice process in many cases cannot be fully private.”).
171. See id. at 186 (“If crime is injury, justice will repair injuries and promote healing.”).
172. See DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 252–53 (1999). Tutu
states:
We shouldn’t underestimate the power of conditioning. That is why I hold the
view that we should be a little more generous, a little more understanding, in judging
perpetrators of human rights violations. This does not mean we will condone what
they and the white community in South Africa did or allowed to happen. But we will
be a little more compassionate in our judgment as we become a little more conscious
of how we too could succumb as easily as they. It will make our judgment just that
little less strident and abrasive and possibly open the door to some being able to
forgive themselves for what they now perceive as weakness and lack of courage.
Id.
173. See STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 23 (arguing that “questions of justification,” which might
lessen moral judgments and reactive attitudes, are internal to the process).
174. See generally Rosen, supra note 52, at 307 (suggesting that conditions might exist for
imposing moral responsibility).
175. See generally id. at 306−07 (suggesting that original responsibility can only be determined
when we can determine an individual has made an akratic act after fulfilling certain procedural
epistemic duties).
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providing a set of tools for individuals to correct their own character
development. In the case of a child with an abusive father, for instance,
“presponses” intervene to present the child with appropriate alternatives. 176
By addressing the social history of crime and criminal, ADR allows
individuals to better locate the agent as potential akratic actor, have
appropriate reactive attitudes in the future, and impose moral judgments. 177
Next time a child turns to violence to solve a problem with a classmate, we
can have an appropriate reactive attitude; 178 we better know that the reason
he responded violently was not because he did not know any better, but that
he knew the pertinent facts, knew that it was wrong, and “[knew] that in the
circumstances, all things considered, he should not do it,” but did it
anyway. 179 The resulting moral condemnation, then, is an appropriate
reactive attitude. 180
By making a connection between appropriate reactive attitudes and
public norms, ADR avoids the Fiss critique 181 by putting substantive and
procedural norms of public justice at the center of the effort to restore the
offender to a condition of public agency subject to the full spectrum of
reactive attitudes. The offender is inculcated with public norms for his
future private decision-making, but because the community plays such a
large role in this paradigm, public norms are also reinforced for society. 182
Complementarily, by focusing on the act’s social history to allow for
appropriate future moral judgment, the community—particularly by
developing “presponses”—rights actual wrongs. 183 By confronting
environmental factors proactively, ADR avoids the critique that its primary
concern with “facilitat[ing]” settlement left it procedurally inept at
addressing root causes. 184

176. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. In the case of the violent student, “presponses”
help the child choose the option more accommodating of public norms, even though non-moral payoffs
may seem more advantageous.
177. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
179. Rosen, supra note 52, at 307.
180. See STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 6–7 (suggesting that reactive attitudes can be mollified);
Rosen, supra note 52, at 307–08 (suggesting that we can determine an akratic actor).
181. See Fiss, supra note 26, at 1085−89 (arguing that ADR problematically privatizes the
dispute, prohibiting it from promulgating core public norms).
182. See HAHN, supra note 114, at 134 (arguing that restorative justice procedures can
“contribute more fully to the rule of law as it affects them”).
183. Compare HARRINGTON, supra note 44, at 73−74 (suggesting that ADR is not framed to
right actual legal wrongs).
184. Id.
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D. A Transitional Justice Defense of ADR’s Approach
Transitional justice literature 185 highlights how ADR procedures avoid
the Fiss critique and fulfill the law’s public role by cultivating a social
regard for the interconnectedness reflected in public norms. 186 ADR may
“privatize” the dispute by removing it from the confines of the courts, 187 but
does so to fulfill restorative justice’s central concern for, in Archbishop
Desmond Tutu’s terms, “the healing of breaches, the redressing of
imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, [and the rehabilitation
of] both the victim and the perpetrator . . . .” 188 Shifting the focus of the
harm from the state to relationships allows for the exploitation of
community to cultivate, what Tutu and other transitional justice literature
refers to as, ubuntu 189 and re-legitimize the existing political scheme. 190
Tutu’s concerns in utilizing a restorative remedy, similar in many
respects to ADR, was to draw on natural human relations to reinforce social
order and public norms. 191 Tutu argued that the South African Truth and
185. See Bronwyn Leebaw, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of
Califonia, Riverside, Beyond Therapy: Truth Commissions and Restorative Justice as Responses to
Systematic Political Violence at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association (May 29, 2009)
(on file with author), for an exploration of how truth commissions advance restorative justice by
addressing underlying systemic conflict and injustice, as opposed to therapeutic justice, which reduces
“injury” to psychological harm and recovery. Thanks are owed to Professor Bronwyn Leebaw whose
draft for the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association provided insight crucial to the
development of this Article.
186. Restorative justice, when applied to transitional situations, furthers the reasoning behind
my argument. Transitional justice literature suggests that restorative approaches recognize that “pretransitional abuses are symptoms of social and political pathologies[]” and “provide a path to the future
by laying the groundwork for social, political, and legal change.” David Gray, An Excuse-Centered
Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2621, 2690 (2006). Likewise, the restorativebased approaches under the umbrella of “ADR” recognize that criminality may be a product of “social
and political pathologies,” id., that need to be corrected in order to fulfill government’s duty as “conduit
for knowledge of right and wrong . . . leading up to prosecution and punishment,” id. at 2656. On a
much less serious level, these retroactive and proactive approaches legitimize government’s role and
counteract risk factors in an attempt to prevent their development in the future. See id. at 2690
(suggesting that transitional justice demands that conditions are “create[d]” or “restore[d]” “to ensure
the success of a new regime”).
187. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3, at 425–26.
188. TUTU, supra note 172, 54–55.
189. Id. at 31 (describing “[a] person with ubuntu [as] open and available to others, affirming of
others . . . he or she belongs in the greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or
diminished”).
190. See Leebaw, supra note 185, at 5 (suggesting that the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission included “a role for political judgment and political responsibility”).
191. See TUTU, supra note 172, at 45–46.
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of
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Reconciliation Commission (TRC) could only fully remedy the harm and
properly publicly promulgate the law by restoring ubuntu, or social
harmony. 192 Tutu’s underlying concern sheds light on Strawson’s key
insight: full justice is achieved, even in the most horrific instances, by
restoring both offender and community to conditions described and
accounted for by reactive attitudes that reflect deep social commitments that
give rise to public norms. 193 ADR, on a lesser scale, cultivates ubuntu by
moving beyond pure legalism and restoring relationships that law and
public norms are designed to protect. 194 The community guides the
offender’s re-entry into society, and communal root conflicts are addressed
by restoring the offender with his community through rehabilitative means,
instead of a distant legal process. 195 The victim in the ADR process, like the
TRC, is forced to take “symbolic” and actual responsibility 196 and make

South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated
gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in
violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be
addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not
for victimization. In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction,
amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated
with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.
Id. Cf. David Gray, Constitutional Faith and Dynamic Stability: Thoughts on Religion, Constitutions,
and Transitions to Democracy, 69 MD. L. REV. 26, 37 (2009) (noting that religious figures, like
Desmond Tutu, are “prominent in the Pantheon of peacemakers”).
192. TUTU, supra note 172, at 16−17.
193. See STRAWSON, supra note 54, at 22−23 (suggesting that internal reactive attitudes are the
foundation of moral judgments, not external considerations); see also Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela,
Alternatives to Revenge: Building a Vocabulary of Reconciliation Through Political Pardon, in THE
PROVOCATIONS OF AMNESTY: MEMORY, JUSTICE AND IMPUNITY 51, 53 (Charles Villa-Vicencio and
Erik Doxtader eds., 2003) (arguing that the “duty to prosecute” limits the framework of justice to
“criminal jurisprudence” because it “focuses strictly on the question of individual responsibility” when
apartheid’s human rights violations must find resolution through other avenues, in particular restorative
justice, which gives victims a voice, a “sense of affirmation[,] and validation that is so crucial for the
healing”).
194. See ZEHR, supra note 111, at 186 (arguing that the goal of justice should be restitution and
healing for victims).
195. See id. at 184 (noting that the solution must address the relationship and place the emphasis
on the interpersonal connections).
196. See id. at 192 (arguing that the offender takes responsibility). Some commentators on the
TRC argue that beyond documenting the past and providing victims with the opportunity to put “their
stories on record,” “some of the perpetrators were able to move beyond mere description and to reflect
on the ethical component of their actions, to begin to feel sorry for what they had done.” See GodoboMadikizela, supra note 193, at 51. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, for example, suggests that even though
all of the perpetrator’s apologies were not sincere, the “rendering of apologetic remarks, offered directly
to families who had lost loved ones, laid the groundwork for the TRC hearings to engender something
even more important than reams of testimony: it opened the door to the possibility of rendering political
pardon morally defensible.” Id. at 51.
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amends to the victim and community. 197 Thus, ADR does a better job at
promulgating the law through community sharing in the restorative
process 198 because only by cultivating ubuntu through a reconciliatory
dialogue can justice—and the full role of the law—be fulfilled. 199
Through the process, ADR, like the TRC, addresses political
accountability and legitimizes legal systems by addressing larger social
problems. 200 Charles Villa-Vicencio has argued that a larger political
restorative justice approach allowed the TRC to promote a democratic
dialogue to restore the political community. 201 Confidence in the rule of law
had to be restored, but closure had to simultaneously be brought to a “dark
chapter in South African history.” 202 Prosecution of offenders would not
help “heal” a troubled nation; 203 rather, full healing would require
addressing the needs of victims and survivors. 204 Only by exploring “legal
accountability, citizen responsibility, and material acquisition to the forging
of new notions of belonging[,]” 205 could confidence in the rule of law be
restored as a “basis for peaceful coexistence.” 206
197. ZEHR, supra note 111, at 200−01 (suggesting that the offender must make amends for his
crime).
198. See Leebaw, supra note 185, at 18 (exploring Tutu’s claim “that an emphasis on resolving
past conflicts and addressing abuses through the courts is in tension with the goal of establishing a sense
of shared community in South Africa because it will undermine the quality of ubuntu”).
199. See TUTU, supra note 172, at 30−31 (asserting that community forgiveness and
rehabilitation can be fostered through open dialogue that focuses on our interconnectedness and shared
humanity).
200. See Charles Villa-Vicencio, Restorative Justice: Ambiguities and Limitations of a Theory,
in THE PROVOCATIONS OF AMNESTY: MEMORY, JUSTICE, AND IMPUNITY, supra note 193, at 30, 31
(arguing that “political restorative justice” must be sought).
201. Id. at 31–32.
202. Id. at 35.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 35−36 (“[Healing] also requires that the restlessness and uncertainty of
perpetrators be addressed. Individual demands for retribution need to be integrated with national needs
for amnesty and reconciliation.”).
205. Id. at 36.
206. Id. at 35. The “conditional amnesty” granted to perpetrators allowed South Africa to “build
social cohesion and to forego revenge in favour of restoring peace.” See Godobo-Madikizela, supra note
193, at 52. Selective prosecution, some argued, was the proper way to proceed because it would
simultaneously promote “state integrity” and justice. See, e.g., Dumisa Ntsebeza, Responding to the
Symposium, in THE PROVOCATIONS OF AMNESTY: MEMORY, JUSTICE, AND IMPUNITY, supra note 193,
at 23, 25. As Part III argued on the backs of Strawson and Ayer’s critical insights, a theory of criminal
punishment in which we seek full justice must account for the failure of society and the failure of the
offender. See supra Part III. In the context of mass atrocities, then, the TRC sought transitional justice
by addressing both society and the offender through conditional amnesty and reparation. See Ntsebeza,
supra, at 25 (“Selective prosecution is the only way forward. For reasons of justice, this must happen.
For reasons of state integrity, this must happen – the TRC has recommended appropriate prosecutions,
and the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act provides for them to happen.”); Erik
Doxatader & Charles Villa-Vicencio, Introduction: Provocations at the End of Amnesty, in THE
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Like Fiss, Villa-Vicencio recognized the public role of law, but unlike
Fiss, he realized that it could be fulfilled through restorative justice, outside
of the courtroom. 207 In the transitional society struggling to bridge the law’s
administration and the state’s integrity following “illegitimate rule and
lawlessness,” Villa-Vicencio realized the importance of legitimizing the
laws while also reconciling the relationships between victim, offender, and
community. 208 South Africa had to demonstrate the capacity to enforce
rules “enshrined in [its] founding constitution” while “promot[ing] the
fullest participation by citizens in a process that claim[ed] to be driven by . .
.
ubuntu.” 209 He believed that restorative justice best implemented measures
that counteracted the retributive demands of victims and survivors. 210
ADR similarly resolves the conflict, albeit on a much smaller level, by
providing a way for the government to enforce its constitutional ideals while
addressing the role of environmental factors in private engagement with
public norms. 211 ADR is a vehicle through which individuals can be
instructed to form the necessary cognitive and moral skills that underlie
public norms and make law-abiding behavior natural instead of a response to
a forceful threat. 212 ADR, therefore, embraces the Aristotlean notion that
PROVOCATIONS OF AMNESTY: MEMORY, JUSTICE, AND IMPUNITY, supra note 193, at x, xiv (“[T]he
amnesty process was to provide a means for perpetrators ‘to become active, full and creative members
of the new order’. . . . [F]or both victims and perpetrators to cross the historic bridge from the past to the
future . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); George Bizos, Why Prosecutions are Necessary, in THE
PROVOCATIONS OF AMNESTY: MEMORY, JUSTICE, AND IMPUNITY, supra note 193, at 5, 5 (arguing that
amnesty, “but not blanket amnesty” was a “middle way” that gave “both perpetrators and victims[] the
opportunity to speak about the past and present conflict”).
207. See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 200, at 31–32 (arguing that the TRC “negotiat[ed] a way
through the ambiguities inherent to political transition from oppressive, autocratic rule to the beginning
of democracy”); see also Gobodo-Madikizela, supra note 193, at 53 (“Unlike a court of law, where
victims are brought into the picture only in relation to the perpetrator’s deed, the TRC put victims in the
centre of the process, allowing them to tell their stories . . . .”).
208. Villa-Vicencio, supra note 200, at 36.
209. Id. at 37.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part III.B.
212. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at III. I. 1110b12–17. Aristotle states:
Also, those who act by force and are unwilling act with pain, while those who act
on account of what is pleasant and beautiful do so with pleasure. And it is
ridiculous to blame external things but not oneself, for being easily caught by
such things, and to take credit oneself for beautiful deeds but blame the pleasant
things for one’s shameful deeds. So it appears that what is forced is that of which
the source is from outside, while the one who is forced contributes nothing.
Id.; see also Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trials for Violations of
International Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1477075 (suggesting that trials, as justice mechanisms, internalize norms “through dramatization of the
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private character is a function of public enculturation by allowing the
government to reach beyond the courtroom to better fulfill the mandates of a
just society. 213 By endorsing ADR, the government can use the community to
“teach” public values and re-legitimize itself in the process. 214
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that debates between free will advocates and
determinists and contests between ADR advocates and skeptics, such as
Fiss, are useful in that both miss the point. Instead of focusing on either the
offender or society, legitimate criminal punishment systems must address
both failures to fully promulgate public norms. 215 Under a restorative lens,
ADR emerges as a theory of criminal punishment that accounts for both
failures and is better equipped than traditional systems to reach full
justice. 216 ADR procedures exploit the Strawsonian emphasis on the
interpersonal connections captured in public norms and correct
environmental risk factors that have influenced the offender to
sympathetically, meaningfully, and holistically bring “recalcitrant reality
closer to our chosen ideals.” 217
As a practical matter, the theory of criminal punishment advanced here
offers a potential framework through which we can begin to construct ADR
procedures. These procedures rehabilitate offenders, who will benefit from
the intervention and become assets to society, while respecting
responsibility and renewing public norms. Future work will critique and
refine the arguments addressed here, particularly the intricacies of character
development and the most cost-effective ways of implementing these
procedures, including how to identify the most impressionable offenders, to
discover the best means of applying this theoretical framework in the
community.
effects of the wrongdoing[ ] and stigmatization of the offender); id. at 9 n.26 (suggesting that truth
commissions might be an alternative venue of norm internalization efforts because it “has as its goal
recording the history behind severe violations of international law,” but noting that it cannot impose
punishment that deters to such extent as trials).
213. ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, at I. IX. 1099b30–31 (“[T]he highest good is the end of politics,
while it takes the greatest part of its pains to produce citizens of a certain sort . . . .”).
214. Villa-Vicencio argued that, “[w]here . . . government fails to demonstrate an ability to deal
with poverty and alienation, the affirmation of basic human rights, corruption, crime, greed and related
concerns, the competency and legitimacy of that government will be questioned.” Villa-Vicencio, supra
note 193, at 37. Developing “presponses” targeted towards “clusters” of risk factors provides one way
that government can justify its existing structure and rule of law to avoid these claims.
215. See supra Part III.A.
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. Fiss, supra note 26, at 1089.
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